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FAIRNESS PRINCIPLES FOR INSURANCE CONTRACTS IN THE
PRESENCE OF DEFAULT RISK
DELIA COCULESCU AND FREDDY DELBAEN
Abstract. We use the theory of cooperative games for the design of fair insurance con-
tracts. An insurance contract needs to specify the premium to be paid and a possible
participation in the benefit (or surplus) of the company. It results from the analysis that
when a contract is exposed to the default risk of the insurance company, ex-ante equilibrium
considerations require a certain participation in the benefit of the company to be specified
in the contracts. The fair benefit participation of agents appears as an outcome of a game
involving the residual risks induced by the default possibility and using fuzzy coalitions.
1. Introduction
In insurance theory in contrast to financial theory, we cannot use the equilibrium consider-
ations of the arbitrage pricing theory for valuation purposes. Such a use would require that
agents are able to sell short risk exposures or to hold risky positions of their choice. Instead,
in insurance, the principle of insurable interest holds and this imposes that agents entering
insurance contracts have an exposure to the insured risks. The only available actions by
agents remain decisions on accepting or not accepting the proposed insurance contracts. In
this situation, cooperative game theory is the right tool, as it provides equilibrium concepts
that can be used for valuation purposes. This paper is intended to exploit this idea by char-
acterising fair contracts in presence of default risk. It is worth noting that similarly to the
arbitrage theory, we will avoid dealing with utility functions of economic agents and only
focus on the relation between the premium paid and the payoffs of the contracts.
The common approach in insurance is to use so-called premium calculation principles,
having plausible properties from an economic standpoint. One such largely agreed upon
property is convexity, which ensures that diversification of risks, which is desirable from an
economic pointy of view, is accounted for in the premium calculation. Fair allocation of total
premia to individual contracts using coherent risk measures and cooperative game theory
was already employed in the literature (see [11]); fair allocations being defined as allocations
in the core of a cooperative game. We shall use this type of framework as a starting point.
But the approaches so far completely left out the default risk of the insurance company
from the analysis. Indeed, in presence of default risk, the insured agents may remain exposed
to a residual risk even after signing an insurance contract, as they might not fully receive
the promised indemnities. Furthermore, the insured agents are not similarly exposed to
the default risk of the insurance company, their loss in default being determined by the
dependence between individual risk and total risk. Thus, the question of the fairness of the
insurance contracts comes in naturally whenever the insurance company may default.
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We choose to treat the problem of default risk as a time 1 allocation, or allocation of con-
tracts’ random payments, as opposed to the premia allocation, which is a time 0 allocation,
or cost allocation. This time 1 allocation consists in characterising the payoffs that are to
be paid at time 1 for each contract, depending on the realisation of the risks and whether
the company defaults or not. In our approach, agents can form coalitions and compare costs
and residual risks of the corresponding defaultable contracts. The residual risk of one agent
measures the impact of the default risk of the insurance firm on the corresponding contract.
Problems related to allocations of random payoffs have a long history in insurance, for
instance in the study of the optimal reinsurance or optimal risk transfer. Already Borch
[9] mentions cooperative game theory as a mean of selecting among Pareto equilibria in
a reinsurance problem. More recently and using coherent functions (either utilities or risk
measures) there is a vast literature on optimal risk transfer that treats also time 1 allocations.
We refer to Heath and Ku [16], Barrieu and El Karoui [5], [6], Jouini et al. [18], Filipovic´
and Kupper [17], Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [8]. Conceptually, the approach in the current
paper is distinct from the literature on optimal risk transfers using coherent functions. Main
differences are underlined in the title. First, we are interested in fair payoffs of the contracts,
while the literature on risk transfers aims at characterising Pareto optima, given specified
utilities for agents. We will introduce fairness at the same time as Pareto optimality. Instead
of defining utility functions for the agents, we use a predefined, coherent price system and the
desire of agents of paying the least of costs. Secondly, and more fundamentally, in the current
paper the main question is the default risk of the insurance contracts. In the above mentioned
literature, agents hold risky positions and at time 1 in equilibrium, some agents pay other
agents (hence the name of risk transfer). This is not a classical situation in the context where
agents are the insured: in general, insured agents do not make ex-post monetary transfers
to compensate for losses that other insured agents incurred. Consequently, we propose that
all payments at time 1 are made from and within the limits of the existing capital of the
insurance firm. As claims in default are determined by bankruptcy procedures, we introduce
the class of admissible payments that fulfil bankruptcy priority rules.
The remaining of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the pre-
cise mathematical setting of premium calculation principles that we are using, which are
commonotonic submodular functions. Section 3 presents the insurance model the economic
problem to solve. Section 4 formultates the fairness principles in a game theoretic framework.
Solving the time 1 allocation requires additional theoretical development. This is introduced
in Section 5 where we propose the concept of state coalitions as a mean of reducing the set
of solutions. This allows a more precise characterisation of fair payoffs and the proofs of the
main results follow immediately.
2. Setup and notation
We work in a simple model consisting of two dates: time 0, where everything is known, and
a fixed future date, time 1, where randomness is involved. For the purpose of representing the
possible outcomes at time 1, a probability space (Ω,F ,P) is fixed. Unless otherwise specified,
all equalities and inequalities involving random variables are to be considered in an P a.s.
sense. The space of losses (or claims) occurring time 1 is considered to be L∞(Ω,F ,P),
simply denoted L∞, i.e., the collection of all essentially bounded random variables.
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At time 0, the (manager of the) insurance company needs to evaluate the liabilities at
time 1. The valuation method chosen will have an impact on the pricing of the individual
insurance contracts as it will be explained later on. We shall assume that the total liability
in the company’s balance sheet is evaluated by means of a convex functional P : L∞ → R
fulfilling the properties detailed below.
Definition 1. A mapping P : L∞ → R is called a convex valuation function if the following
properties hold
(1) if 0 ≤ ξ ∈ L∞ then P(ξ) ≥ 0.
(2) P is convex i.e. for all ξ, η ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 we have P(λξ + (1 − λ)η) ≤ λP(ξ) +
(1− λ)P(η),
(3) for a ∈ R and ξ ∈ L∞, P(ξ + a) = P(ξ) + a
(4) if ξn ↑ ξ (with ξn ∈ L∞) then P(ξn)→ P(ξ).
If moreover for all 0 ≤ λ ∈ R, P(λξ) = λP(ξ), we call P coherent.
The number P(ξ) may be interpreted as a risk adjusted valuation of the future uncertain
position ξ. More specifically, we shall consider P to be a premium principle that the insurance
company uses to determine the total premia to be collected from the insured, when the
insurance company faces liability ξ at time 1. This reflects the view that insurance premia
should be dependent on the whole portfolio of insurance contracts (see Deprez and Gerber
[15]).
Property (1) in the definition is therefore clear: liability tomorrow brings cash today
for the insurance firm; or, conversely, premium collected time 0 corresponds to liability
in insurer’s balance sheet. The convexity property is a translation of the diversification
benefit. Combinations of risks are less risky than individual positions and, in presence
of high competition on the insurance market, it is reasonable to believe that the benefits
from the diversification will be passed along to the insured, at least partially, through lower
premia. This explains property (2). Property (3) means that risk adjusted valuations are
measured in money units. Of course money time 0 is different from money at the end of the
period. Introducing a deflator or discounting – as is the practice in actuarial business since
hundreds of years – solves this problem. It complicates notation and as long as there is only
one currency involved it does not lead to confusion if one supposes that this discounting is
already incorporated in the variables. The fourth property is a continuity property. Using
monotonicity (a consequence of the previous properties, see [13]), we can also require that
P(ξn) ↑ P(ξ). The homogeneity property is a strong property.
Remark 1. A coherent valuation function P is a submodular function. If we put ρ(ξ) =
P(−ξ) we obtain a coherent risk measure (having the Fatou property); alternatively u(ξ) =
−P(−ξ) defines a coherent utility function (see [12] for more details). Submodular functions
that are commonotonic are commonly used in insurance as nonlinear premium principles.
We will come back to this below, once we define commonotonicity.
We say that a random variable ξ is acceptable if P(ξ) ≤ 0. Remark that ξ−P(ξ) is always
acceptable. If P is coherent, then the acceptability set
A := {ξ | P(ξ) ≤ 0}
is a convex cone. In this paper, the term “acceptability” refers to the insurance company
and its balance sheet, and not to agents’ preferences. Acceptable risks have positive value for
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the insurance company to hold, hence it would accept holding these risks without requiring
a premium payment in exchange.
The continuity assumption allows to apply convex duality theory and leads to the following
representation theorem
Theorem 1. If P is coherent, there exists a convex closed set S ⊂ L1 (with L1 being the
space of all equivalence classes of integrable random variables on (Ω,F ,P)), consisting of
probability measures, absolutely continuous with respect to P, such that for all ξ ∈ L∞:
P(ξ) = sup
Q∈S
EQ[ξ]. (2.1)
Conversely each such a set S defines a coherent valuation function.
We will consider such a set S as given and fixed through the analysis, and we will refer
to it as the “scenario set” generating P. An assumption that we will make in this text is
that P is coherent with the set S being weakly compact. The weak compactness property of
S is equivalent to a more stronger continuity property of P than in Definition 1 (4), where
↑’s are replaced by ↓’s. The weak compactness ensures that given ξ ∈ L∞ one can find a
probability measure Qξ ∈ S such that
P(ξ) = EQξ [ξ].
Indeed, the weak compactness of S is also equivalent to the weak subgradient of P at ξ,
∇P(ξ), being non empty for all ξ ∈ L∞. We refer to [13] for the precise statements and
proofs of equivalent formulations for S being weakly compact.
In this text we will also make the assumption that P is commonotonic.
Definition 2. We say that two random variables ξ, η are commonotonic if there exist a
random variable ζ as well as two non-decreasing functions f, g : R → R such that ξ = f(ζ)
and η = g(ζ).
It is easily seen that two random variables ξ, η such that ξ ≤ 0, η ≥ 0 and {ξ < 0} ∩ {η >
0} = ∅, are always commonotonic.
Definition 3. We say that P : L∞ → R is commonotonic if for each couple ξ, η of com-
monotonic random variables we have P(ξ + η) = P(ξ) + P(η).
Remark 2. Commonotonic convex monetary valuation functions are positively homogeneous
and hence coherent.
Addition of commonotonic risks is the opposite of diversification. Indeed, ξ and η being
nondecreasing functions of ζ , neither of them is a hedge against the other. The commono-
tonicity of P can therefore be seen as a translation of the rule: if there is no diversification,
there is also no gain when putting these claims together. Including commotonicity as an
economic principle is considered to be desirable for the purpose of premium calculation or
risk measurement in insurance and many actuarial models are built on the assumption that
the premium principles are commonotonic. For instance, the popular class of concave dis-
tortion risk measures are commonotonic risk measures, hence they can be seen as particular
examples fitting in the framework we develop below.
With P commonotonic, one can prove the following result (this will be useful later on):
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Lemma 1. Let ξ ∈ L∞ and m ∈ R. Then, the following hold:
∇P(ξ) ⊂∇P((ξ −m)+) (2.2)
∇P(ξ) ⊂∇P(−(ξ −m)−) (2.3)
∇P(ξ) ⊂∇P(ξ ∧m). (2.4)
Proof. Using commonotonicity of P we find
P (ξ −m) = P
(
(ξ −m)+
)
+ P
(
−(ξ −m)−
)
(2.5)
Any Q∗ ∈ ∇P(ξ) satisfies:
P(ξ −m) = sup
Q∈S
EQ[ξ −m] = EQ∗ [ξ −m]
P
(
(ξ −m)+
)
≥ EQ∗
(
(ξ −m)+
)
P
(
−(ξ −m)−
)
≥ EQ∗
(
−(ξ −m)−
)
then replacing these expressions in (2.5) we find that
P (ξ −m) = P
(
(ξ −m)+
)
+ P
(
−(ξ −m)−
)
(2.6)
≥ EQ∗ [ξ −m] = P(ξ −m), (2.7)
in other words we only have equalities. This proves that Q∗ ∈ ∇P((ξ − m)+) and Q∗ ∈
∇P(−(ξ −m)−). Similarily, by commonotonicity and the above:
P(ξ ∧m) = P(ξ)− P
(
(ξ −m)+
)
= EQ∗ [ξ ∧m],
proving Q∗ ∈ ∇P(ξ ∧m). 
There is a link between commonotonic valuation functions and Choquet integration theory
(see Schmeidler [20]). For bounded nonnegative risks ξ, the following representation holds
when P is a commonotonic valuation function:
P(ξ) = sup
µ∈C(w)
Eµ[ξ] =
∫ ∞
0
w(ξ > a)da (2.8)
where w : F → R+ satisfies w(Ω) = 1 and
w(A ∩B) + w(A ∪ B) ≤ w(A) + w(B), (2.9)
and
C(w) := {µ finitely additive measure | µ(Ω) = 1, ∀A ∈ F : 0 ≤ µ(A) ≤ w(A) = P(1A)}.
The use of Choquet integration as premium principle was emphasized by Denneberg, [14].
Denneberg was inspired by the pioneering work of Yaari, [22].
A set function w satisfying (2.9) is called 2-alternating or supermodular and can serve as
a characteristic function for cost games (which are the duals of convex games) and C(w) is
called the core of the game. In general S ⊂ C(w), but when S is weakly compact we have
S = C(w) and the following representation of the scenario set S holds:
S = {µ probability measure | µ≪ P, µ(A) ≤ w(A), ∀A ∈ F}.
In Delbaen [10] and Schmeidler [19] one can find the basics of convex game theory that are
going to be used in this paper.
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To sum up, the properties of P that are going to be used in this paper are:
Assumptions. The valuation function P is commonotonic and the scenario set S (cf. the
representation in (2.1)) is weakly compact in L1.
3. The economic model
We consider N economic agents (N ∈ N∗) that are the potential buyers of insurance.
Each agent i is endowed with a risky position Xi ∈ L∞+ and is considering at time 0 the
option to buy insurance for covering his/her exposure. The insurer will be denoted by the
index 0; his role is to propose insurance contracts to each agent. Also, he provides an initial
capital denoted by k0. We shall propose some principles for the design of fair individual
insurance contracts. The only assumption about the agents preferences is that they prefer
more rather than less and they are risk adverse, as they seek to buy insurance. Therefore,
when comparing different contracts that are proposed to them, the premium to be paid is
an important element in their decision making. They choose the lower premium when the
indemnities are the same. We will have to deal with the issue that the default risk of the
insurance company is depending on the premia collected, impacting the cash flows of the
contracts at time 1. Therefore random cash flows need to be compared as well and not
only premia. This will be detailed in a while (Section 4). We shall assume the insurer’s
contribution k0 exogenous to the analysis, for instance it reflects some exogenous regulatory
constraints and shareholder preferences regarding the riskiness of the company’s shares. The
question of setting a level of the capital k0 is not addressed in this paper.
Therefore, we fix X = (X0, X1, ..., XN), i.e. an N + 1 dimensional vector of random
variables nonnegative and bounded, where X1, ..., XN are the risks to be insured, while
X0 = k0 by convention, i.e, the equity capital brought by the insurer at time 0. For simplicity,
from now on we shall refer to X as the liability vector, even though, the first component X0
is strictly speaking not liability. From now on, N+1 dimensional random vectors will always
appear in bold.
The insurance company uses a commonotonic valuation function P for calculating the
total premia to be collected. Given that the total risk exposure is
SX :=
N∑
i=1
Xi,
the total premium is computed as:
k := P
(
SX
)
(3.1)
so that the total capital1 of the insurance firm is
K := k + k0,
and we will suppose that suppose that P(SX > k) > 0 so that the total premia is not
sufficient to exclude the possibility of default and K > 0. These assumptions exclude some
trivial cases from the analysis.
Hence, we assume the insurance company charges the insured the minimum amount that
makes the aggregate net position acceptable. This reflects the discussion from the previous
section, where we assumed that there are benefits from pooling risks and these benefits are
1We use this term in the frame of this paper to mean total fund that is available in the insurance firm at
time 1; it does not match an accounting definition of total capital.
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passed along to the insured, at least partly. The valuation of the total premia using a convex
functional as in (3.1) is a necessary first step in order to pass along some diversification
benefits to the insured. Remains to ensure that each agent individually “gets her share of
the pie”; here the concept of fairness of the contracts comes into play.
Let us more precisely describe the components of an insurance contract.
3.1. Premia, indemnities and benefit sharing. The insurance company is proposing
insurance contracts to the N agents. In particular, for the risks X1, · · ·XN and with an
initial capital X0 = k0, the insurance company proposes contracts
((pi1, X1, B1), · · · , (piN , XN , BN)) ∈ (R+ × L
∞
+ × L
∞
+ )
N
i.e., a collection of individual contracts, with each individual contract (pii, Xi, Bi) specifying
a premium pii ≥ 0 to be paid by the agent i at time 0 and a promised payoff of the contract
at time 1, consisting of the indemnity Xi and possibly a participation in the benefit of the
company, Bi ≥ 0 (dividend). One may want to consider all Bi = 0, i.e., there is no such
benefit sharing proposed in the contracts. In this case, the insurer will receive the whole
benefit in the form of a dividend. We shall deal with the issue of the benefit sharing using
equilibrium considerations, rather than taking from the outset the point of view that there
is or not such a participation proposed within a contract.
The actual payments cannot exceed the total capital of the insurance company, and hence
the insurance company defaults when SX > K. The contracts are defaultable and therefore
the promised payment Xi +Bi may differ from the actual payment of the contract, denoted
Yi. This satisfies
Yi = Xi +Bi if the company does not default
Yi < Xi if the company defaults on its contracts.
It follows that the actual payment and the benefit participation are linked by the relation
Bi = (Yi −Xi)
+.
As the insurer brings in an initial capital k0, he is entitled at time 1 to a dividend
Y0 :=
(
K −
N∑
i=1
Yi
)+
,
that is, the payoff to the insurer is the residual value, once all payoffs to the insured are paid
out.
All payments by the insurance company occurring at time 1 will be called payoffs ; they
are indemnities and dividends and they represent the actual monetary transfers from the
insurance firm toward the agents, as opposed to the promised payments of the contracts.
We shall restrict our analysis to the class of payoffs that are feasible, i.e., they do not exceed
the total capital available and also respect the legal requirement that indemnities have a
higher priority of payment over dividends. These are called admissible payoffs.
Definition 4. We denote by X the space of N + 1 dimensional random variables which are
bounded. We consider the liability vector X = (X0, ..., XN) ∈ X with all Xi ≥ 0 and X0
constant and consider K another constant satisfying X0 ≤ K.
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(a) We call payoff of total mass K any vector Y = (Y0, · · · , YN) ∈ X that satisfies∑N
i=0 Yi = K and each Yi is σ(Xi, S
X) measurable. The class of payoffs of total mass
K is denoted by X (X, K).
(b) The class of admissible payoffs of total mass K, corresponding to the liability X =
(X0, ..., XN) ∈ X is defined as:
AX(K) =
{
Y ∈ X (X, K)
∣∣∣∣ ∀i ≥ 1 : Yi1{SX>K} = XiSXK1{SX>K}Yi1{SX≤K} ≥ Xi1{SX≤K}
}
.
Admissible payoffs respect the following rules: all insurance claims Xi, i ≥ 1 are paid
entirely to the insured whenever there is sufficient capital to do so (SX ≤ K); default occurs
when the total insurance claim exceeds the total capital (SX > K); in case of default no
dividend is distributed and the insured have equal priority of their claims. Hence in default
all capital K is distributed as indemnities, proportionally to the claim size. The fact that
an admissible payoff component Yi is considered σ(Xi, S
X) measurable ensures that we can
specify ex-ante within the contracts the form of the payoffs as functions of the individual
risk and total risk only. This ensures that each agent can observe time 1 their payoff and
judge if it respects the contract, without necessarily having knowledge of the losses of the
other agents individually. This assumption reflects the practice in the industry. From a
mathematical point of view it is not a necessary condition though.
Example 1. Standard payoffs. Let us consider that each insured receives some constant
proportion of the company’s benefit
(
k − SX
)+
. In this case, these constant proportions can
be specified in the contracts at time 0. The corresponding admissible payoffs (that we shall
call standard payoffs) are given as follows:
Yi =
[
Xi + αi
(
k − SX
)]
1{SX≤k} +Xi
(
K
SX
∧ 1
)
1{SX>k}, i = 1, . . . , N (3.2)
Y0 =
[
k0 + α0
(
k − SX
)]
1{SX≤k} +
(
K − SX
)+
1{SX>k}, (3.3)
where k = K − X0 = K − k0 is the total premium and each αi is a nonnegative constant
and
∑N
i=0 αi = 1. The standard allocations have the feature that the surplus (or benefit)
(K − SX)+ is shared between the agents and the insurer as follows:
- when SX ∈ [k,K], the insurer takes all the surplus, as it does not exceed his initial
contribution (the equity capital) k0.
- when SX < k, there is a benefit and all agents and the insurer receive some fixed
share of the benefit.
For the insured the benefit writes:
Bi = αi
(
k − SX
)+
.
Definition 5. The payoff vector Y is called standard if they are of the form (3.2)-(3.3). The
corresponding contracts (pii, Yi) are then called standard.
3.2. Problem description. A liability vector X ∈ X is fixed, with X0 = k0 ≥ 0 constant.
The design of a contract corresponding to the risk Xi requires specifying two components: pii,
the premium and Bi ≥ 0, i.e., a possible benefit participation. This is the same as specifying
a premium pii and a random payment Yi, the actual contract payment. We saw above that
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the actual payment Yi and the the benefit participation are linked by:
Bi = (Yi −Xi)1{SX<K} = (Yi −Xi)
+.
Therefore, the contracts’ design problem reduces to the specification of a cost vector pi =
(pi0, ..piN) ∈ R
N+1
+ satisfying pi0 = k0 and
∑N
i=0 pii = K, and a payoff vector Y = (Y0, ..., YN) ∈
AX(K).
When are costs pi and payoffs Y fair? We will take the point of view of each stakeholder
(insurer or insured) and identify individual and collective rationality conditions for accepting
the costs pi and payoffs Y that are proposed to them. The stakeholders’ objectives are partly
cooperative and partly conflicting. On the one hand, by cooperating, i.e., pooling the risks,
diversification is achieved and this is beneficial for the insured globally, as it reduces the
total cost to be payed by a group. This total cost reduction on the other hand needs to be
allocated among all stakeholders and here objectives are conflicting: each one aims at paying
a low cost pii, while securing the largest payoff Yi for themselves . Cooperative game theory
is providing solutions concepts in this context. Two distinct problems need to be considered:
- Time 0 allocation, or cost allocation: allocate the total capital K to contributions of
individual agents at time 1. The aim is to determine pi = (pii)
N
i=0 ∈ R
N+1
+ , such that∑N
i=0 pii = K. For consistency with our initial assumptions, the allocation method
will lead to pi0 = k0 = X0, that is, the shareholder will bring in the equity capital
entirely.
- Time 1 allocation, or payoff allocation: conditionally on the realisation of the vector
X, allocate the total fund K to the stakeholders. The aim is to select a random
vector Y ∈ AX(K) with Yi being the actual payment to agent i.
4. Cooperative games and the notion of fairness of insurance contracts
In this section we define the fair contracts as outcomes of cooperative games. The notion
of a fair cost allocation that is based on equilibrium in a cooperative game, was introduced
already in Delbaen [11], [13]. We go further and also employ convex games for solving the
time 1 allocation problem, that is, the determination of the family of random payoffs Y.
In [11] it was shown that starting from any given risk vector X = (X0, ..., XN) and given
a coherent valuation function P, one can define a cooperative game as follows. Let N :=
{0, ..., N} be the set of players, consisting of all agents and the insurer; 2N is the set of all
possible groups of players, named coalitions. We refer to N as the grand coalition. We then
define a cost game (N , 2N , cX), with cX being the characteristic cost function of the game,
cX : 2N → R defined as:
cX(S) := P
(∑
i∈S
Xi
)
, for all S ∈ 2N .
In the literature, one often encounters a value function of the game instead of a cost function.
The value function vX is obtained as vX(S) := cX(N )− cX(N \ S); vX expresses value (or
profit) and eplayers aim to get the most possible, while cX measures costs that players intend
to minimise. As we study cost allocation here, it is more intuitive to use the cost function
cX, instead of the value function vX. All concepts from profit games can easily be translated
to the cost setting.
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The set of actions available to a coalition S consists of all possible divisions (xi), i ∈ S
of cX(S) among the members of S,
∑
i∈S xi = c
X(S). We search for an action of the grand
coalition that is stable, in the sense that no coalition S can obtain a better outcome. The
set of such actions is called the core of the game (see Shapley [21] for more details):
C
(
cX
)
:=
{
x = (xi, i ∈ N )
∣∣∣ ∑
i∈N
xi = c
X(N ) and for all S ∈ 2N
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ c
X(S)
}
We follow [11] and propose the following definition:
Definition 6. An element pi = (pii, i ∈ N ) ∈ C(c
X) is called a fair cost allocation for the
risk vector X.
We remark that if pi ∈ C
(
cX
)
we necessarily have that pi0 = k0. Indeed pi0 ≤ cX(k0) = k0
and
∑
j≥1 pij ≤ P(
∑
j≥1Xj) = k. But
∑
j≥0 pij = K = k0 + k and hence the two inequalities
must be equalities.
The characteristic function cX gives for any coalition the value of its liability, using the
valuation function of the insurance company P. From the standpoint of the agents in a
coalition S, cX(S) represents a cost they have to bear for insurance, should they decide to
split from the grand coalition. A fair premia is therefore simply any repartition of the total
capital K in N + 1 individual costs representing the contribution of each agent, such that
no coalition prefers to split from the grand coalition in order to become a separate entity to
be insured.
Once the costs allocated, the next problem is determining the payoffs of the contracts, in
particular a fair benefit allocation. This requires to specify a preference order on the space
of payoff vectors X , i.e., the space of bounded, N +1 dimensional random variables. As said
previously, we do not assume any specific utility function for the agents, but simply that
they are preferring to pay less rather than more and are risk adverse. In other words, they
have increasing utility functions and care about the cost of insurance.
The following definition introduces the most natural preference order for each coalition,
namely the cheapest to insure payoff is preferred by any group of agents. Given that any
agent i has already an exposure Xi, this gives the following:
Definition 7. Given two payoff vectors ξ,η ∈ X , we say that the coalition S ∈ 2N prefers
ξ to η, and we write η ≺S ξ if:
P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − ξi)
)
< P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − ηi)
)
.
or, alternatively:
cX−ξ(S) < cX−η(S).
The weak preference relation is denoted by S , namely we write η S ξ if the coalition S
does not prefer η to ξ; indifference is denoted by ∼S.
Remark 3. We notice that with our definition of preferences, a coalition S aggregates value
from each of its members and does not care about allocations of costs or payoffs among its
members: whenever ξ,η ∈ X satisfy
∑
i∈S ξi =
∑
i∈S ηi, the coalition is indifferent between
the two vectors:
ξ ∼S η.
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This is nothing but the concept of transferable utility, a common assumption in cooperative
games.
Below we are going to apply preferences to net payoffs, which are payoffs from insurance
minus costs of insurance. It is therefore important to notice that a coalition S will be
indifferent between 0 = (0, ..., 0) and any payoff ξ satisfying
∑
i∈S ξi = 0.
Remark 4. Any risk ξ ∈ X satisfying
∑
i∈S(Xi − ξi) ∈ A satisfies 0 S ξ.
We propose the following
Definition 8. Given a fair cost allocation pi, a fair payoff for the risk vector X, is a vector
of random variables Y ∈ AX(K) satisfying
0 S Y − pi ∀S ∈ 2
N , (4.1)
with 0 = (0, ..., 0) ∈ X .
As a member of the grand coalition, player i ∈ N pays pii and receives at time 1 the
payoff Yi. Therefore Y − pi represents the vector of net payoffs of players. A coalition S
has therefore a net payoff
∑
i∈S(Yi − pii). Alternatively, a coalition S has a total cost c
X(S)
to be paid at time 0 and a total payoff of cX(S) that can be distributed to members of the
coalition at time 1. The net payoff at the coalition level is therefore 0. The interpretation of
(4.1) is therefore the following: fair payoffs are such that any coalition S prefers Y−pi to a
null net cash flow, that is, prefers buying insurance within the grand coalition rather than
doing this as a separate entity.
An alternative — maybe easier to understand — expression for (4.1) is the following
cX−Y(S) +
∑
i∈S
pii ≤ c
X(S) ∀S ∈ 2N , (4.2)
where cX−Y is the value of the residual claims of the coalition S,
cX−Y(S) = P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
)
.
The intuition behind the expression (4.2) is as follows. As usual, player i is exposed to risk
Xi; we consider each player aims at achieving full coverage of their risk at the lowest possible
cost. To achieve full coverage of risks, agents consider also the cost to insure residual risks
P(Xi − Yi), they need to pay additional insurance cost if this quantity is positive. Every
coalition S looks at the proposed cost allocation pi and payoff allocation Y within the grand
coalition and compare with the stand alone situation.
Hence, when the payoff Yi is distributed to player i as a member of the grand coalition,
it leaves agent i with a residual risk Xi − Yi. All players now need to cover their residual
risks. They can decide to form coalitions for this purpose. The residual cost of achieving
an acceptable position for a coalition S is P
(∑
i∈S(Xi − Yi)
)
= cX−Y(S). Hence, all players
may consider entering a second game (the re-insurance game), with characteristic function
cX−Y.
Alternatively, a coalition S, by paying a premia cX(S) achieves directly an acceptable
residual value and reinsurance is costless. Indeed,∑
i∈S
Xi − c
X(S) ∈ A.
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If the cost allocation and the payoffs of the initial game (N , 2N , cX) are fair, any coalition
can achieve an acceptable position at a lower cost as members of the grand coalition and with
possibly a reinsurance of the residual risk, rather than forming from the outset a separate
group.
It is important to emphasize that in general the residual risk Xi − Yi of an agent is non
zero, because of the default risk of the company.
For this reason, in addition to fairness, it seems important that payoffs are tailored in a
way that achieves Pareto optimality, in the cost minimisation problem of the residual risks
of all agents:
Definition 9. A payoff family Y ∈ AX(K) is said to be maximal if it is a solution of the
following cost minimisation problem:
inf
ξ∈AX(K)
N∑
i=0
P(Xi − ξi).
Lemma 2. Standard payoffs are maximal.
Proof. For any ξ,η ∈ AX(K) we have
N∑
i=0
P((Xi − ξi)
+) =
N∑
i=0
P((Xi − ηi)
+). (4.3)
Indeed, we have that the acceptability of ξ implies for all i ∈ N : {Xi− ξi > 0} ⊂ {SX > k}
and the payoffs in default are entirely fixed by the admissibility conditions: ξi1{SX>k} =
ηi1{SX>k}. It follows that (Xi − ξi)
+ = (Xi − ηi)+, ∀i ∈ N , hence (4.3) is verified.
For any random variable ξ, P(Xi − ξ) = P ((Xi − ξ)+) + P (−(Xi − ξ)−) by commono-
tonicity of P. Using this property and (4.3), it follows that Y is maximal if and only if it is
a solution of
inf
ξ∈AX(K)
N∑
i=0
P
(
−(Xi − ξi)
−
)
. (4.4)
As P is convex, for any ξ ∈ AX(K):
∑N
i=0P (−(Xi − ξi)
−) ≥ P
(
−
∑N
i=0(Xi − ξi)
−
)
=
P
(
−(SX −K)−
)
. So, the quantity in (4.4) is bounded below by P
(
−(SX −K)−
)
.
To conclude, we notice that Y standard, implies all (Xi − Yi)
− commonotonic, so that∑N
i=0P (−(Xi − Yi)
−) = P
(
−
∑N
i=0(Xi − Yi)
−
)
= P
(
−(SX −K)−
)
. 
We now return to the insurance problem and give some definitions for this framework.
Definition 10. Consider the risks (Xi)
N
i=1 and some corresponding contracts {(pii, Yi)}
N
i=1
with initial capital X0 = k0. We denote pi0 := K −
∑N
i=1 pii and Y0 = K −
∑N
i=1 Yi .
(1) The premia (pii)
N
i=1 are said to be fair if pi0 = k0 and pi = (pi0, ..., piN ) is a fair cost
allocation for the risk vector X = (X0, ..., XN).
(2) The contracts are said to be fair if the premia (pii)
N
i=1 are fair and, given pi =
(pi0, · · · , piN ), Y = (Y0, · · · , YN) is a fair payoff.
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5. Determining fair contracts
The aim of this section is to characterise some fair insurance contracts in presence of
default risk. The main difficulty is the design of fair payoffs for the defaultable contracts.
As a technique to tackle this problem, we propose in Subsection 5.1 a distinct cooperative
game, where players are states of Ω and coalitions are elements of F . The interpretation is
that states are competing to get the highest possible payoff under the threat to split from the
grand coalition Ω. Another interpretation is that for each element A ∈ F , one can create an
available contract that can be entered at time 0 to cover the risk 1A. That is, Arrow-Debreu
risks can be covered by insurance contracts2 and an agent can enter such a contract and
even several such contracts, provided it does not exceed the agent’s true risk exposure (by
the principle of insurable interest). We will show that the fuzzy version of this game is in
fact a generalisation of the game that we introduced in the previous section. In Subsection
5.2, we will prove that ensuring fairness in the “Arrow-Debreu fuzzy game” leads to fairness
of the contracts in the frame of the initial N + 1 player game.
5.1. Arrow-Debreu claims and the families of fair state payoffs. We denote
Z := SX + k0.
Let us consider the following cost game (Ω,F , cZ) with the characteristic function cZ : F → R
is defined as
cZ(A) := P(Z1A), A ∈ F .
Any element in F is now interpreted as a coalition, and F as the set of all coalitions. The
cost cZ(A) = P(Z1A) corresponds to the liability level of the insurance company, relative to
the set A. By the principle of insurable interest, a coalition could not exceed this level of
exposure, that is the cumulative exposure of all agents. But lower levels should be possible
to reach by coalitions but they are currently excluded in this setting. For this reason, we
introduce fuzzy coalitions, where players ω ∈ Ω “choose” a rate of participation in a coalition
instead of a binary decision yes/no:
Definition 11. A fuzzy coalition is a random variable λ : (Ω,F) → [0, 1]. For any fuzzy
coalition λ, the corresponding cost function is cZ : [0, 1]→ R given as cZ(λ) := P(Zλ).
From an economical standpoint, an insurance company that commits to liability Z im-
plicitly commits to any lower liability 0 ≤ ξ ≤ Z as well. This level of risk corresponds to
a fuzzy coalition λ = ξ
Z
. The fuzzy game (Ω,F , cZ) is a generalisation of the finite-player
game (N , 2N , cX) from the previous section. Indeed, the set of players N = {0, ..., N} can
be linked to the following set of fuzzy coalitions {λˆ0, ..., λˆN} with λˆi =
Xi
Z
so that the cost
function of the finite-player game is obtained via the relation
cX(S) = cZ
(∑
i∈S
λˆi
)
, for any S ∈ N .
2Such a market could be labelled as “complete”; however this could lead to some confusions, as we do
not assume that individual agents can eliminate all risks, the contracts that they enter being defaultable.
Also, note that we do not assume that for an A ∈ F there is necessarily an agent i ∈ {1, .., N} having a risk
exposure of 1A.
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Proposition 1. The set function cZ is 2-alternating, that is, it satisfies for all A,B ∈ F :
cZ(A ∩B) + cZ(A ∪ B) ≤ cZ(A) + cZ(B).
This implies that the cost game (Ω,F , cZ) is superadditive.
Proof. For any ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L∞+ , it holds that c
Z(ξ1 ∨ ξ2) + cZ(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) ≤ cZ(ξ1) + cZ(ξ2). Indeed,
using the representation of P in (2.8)-(2.9):
cZ(ξ1 ∨ ξ2) + c
Z(ξ1 ∧ ξ2) = P(Z(ξ1 ∨ ξ2)) + P(Z(ξ1 ∧ ξ2))
= P((Zξ1) ∨ (Zξ2)) + P((Zξ1) ∧ (Zξ2))
=
∫ ∞
0
w ((Zξ1) ∨ (Zξ2) > a) da+
∫ ∞
0
w ((Zξ1) ∧ (Zξ2) > a) da
=
∫ ∞
0
w ({Zξ1 > a} ∪ {Zξ2 > a}) da+
∫ ∞
0
w ({Zξ1 > a} ∩ {Zξ2 > a}) da
≤
∫ ∞
0
w (Zξ1 > a) da+
∫ ∞
0
w (Zξ2 > a) da
≤ P (Zξ1) + P (Zξ2) = c
Z(ξ1) + c
Z(ξ2).
By taking ξ1 = 1A and ξ1 = 1B, we find the claimed inequality. 
In this framework, we consider a family:
{(pi(A), Y (A)), A ∈ F}, (5.1)
where for every set A ∈ F , pi(A) ∈ R+ is interpreted as a cost and Y (A) is a random
variable interpreted as a payoff, both corresponding to the risk exposure Z1A. It remains
to define the notions of fair cost and fair payoffs in this setting. The definitions below are a
generalisation of the ones with finite number of coalitions 2N+1 in Section 4.
Definition 12. (i) A fair cost allocation is any element pi in the core C(cZ) of the game,
C(cZ) =
{
ν ∈ ba(Ω,F ,P) | ν(Ω) = K = cZ(Ω) and ν(A) ≤ cZ(A), ∀A ∈ F
}
.
(ii) The fuzzy core C˜(cZ) of the game is
C˜(cZ) =
{
ν ∈ ba(Ω,F ,P) | ν(Ω) = K = cZ(Ω) and
∫
λdν ≤ P (λZ) , ∀λ : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1]
}
.
A fair cost allocation in the sense of fuzzy games is any element pi in the fuzzy core
of the game.
The notation ba(Ω,F ,P) above stands for the space of bounded, finitely additive measures
absolutely continuous with respect to P. It is easily seen that C˜(cZ) ⊂ C(cZ). Also the weak
compactness of S implies that for An ↓ ∅, we have c
Z(An) ↓ 0. The core C(c
Z) is therefore
a set of sigma-additive measures, in other words C˜(cZ) ⊂ C(cZ) ⊂ L1+ and the two cores are
weakly compact convex sets.
The core is the set of allocations which cannot be improved upon by any coalition. We
can “shrink” it by introducing the fuzzy core, that is the set of allocations which cannot be
improved upon by any fuzzy coalition. The basic papers for this approach are Aubin [4],
Artzner and Ostroy [3] and Billera and Heath [7]. As explained above, using the fuzzy game
approach is interesting as it leads to a generalisation of the game in the previous section.
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Another advantage of using the fuzzy game approach is that the fuzzy core can be char-
acterised and linked to some elements in the scenario set S:
Proposition 2. The following hold:
C˜
(
cZ
)
= Z · ∇P(Z) ⊂ C
(
cZ
)
Z · S ⊂ C
(
cZ
)
− L1+
If Z > 0 a.s. then
C˜
(
cZ
)
= C
(
cZ
)
implies P(Z) = max
Q∈S
EQ[Z] = min
Q∈S
EQ[Z].
Proof. We first show C˜
(
cZ
)
= Z ·∇P(Z). By definition ∇P(Z) = S ∩{ν | ν(Ω) = K}. Take
now ν ∈ Z · S, then obviously ν(ξ) ≤ cZ(ξ) for all ξ ∈ L∞. This shows that Z · ∇P(Z) ⊂
C˜
(
cZ
)
. Conversely, take ν ∈ C˜
(
cZ
)
then ν satisfies ν(λ) ≤ P(λZ) for all λ : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1].
This implies that ν satisfies ν(ξ) ≤ P(ξZ) for all ξ ∈ L∞. Hence ν ∈ Z · S. But then
ν(Ω) = K shows that ν ∈ Z · ∇P(Z).
Let us now prove that Z ·S ⊂ C
(
cZ
)
−L1+. Take Q ∈ S and suppose that Q /∈ C
(
cZ
)
−L1+.
The set C
(
cZ
)
is weakly compact and hence C
(
cZ
)
− L1+ is a closed convex subset of L
1.
The Hahn-Banach theorem then allows to find ξ ∈ L∞ such that
EQ[ξZ] > sup
{
E
[
ξ
(
dν
dP
− h
)]
| ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
; h ∈ L1+
}
.
This implies that ξ ≥ 0 and hence sup{E[ξ(dν/dP− h)) | ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
; h ∈ L1+} = sup{ν(ξ) |
ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
}. We get that∫ ∞
0
EQ[Z1{ξ>u}] du = EQ[ξZ] > sup{ν(ξ) | ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
} =
∫ ∞
0
cZ(ξ > u) du,
which is a contradiction since EQ[Z1{ξ>u}] ≤ c
Z(ξ > u) for all u and all Q ∈ S. The inclusion
can be read as follows. For all Q ∈ S there exists ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
so that Z · dQ
dP
≤ dν
dP
.
If C˜
(
cZ
)
= C
(
cZ
)
, then, for all Q ∈ S there exists Q0 ∈ ∇P(Z) so that Z ·
dQ
dP
≤ Z · dQ0
dP
.
If Z > 0 a.s. then dQ
dP
≤ dQ0
dP
a.s. , that is, Q = Q0 and hence S = ∇P(Z). 
Remark 5. The above proposition shows that the ∧,∨ inequality in the beginning of the
proof of Proposition 1 is not equivalent to commonotonicity. Indeed, the functional cZ is not
commonotonic since it is different from sup{ν(ξ) | ν ∈ C
(
cZ
)
} which is the uniquely defined
commonotonic extension of cZ restricted to F .
We now define random payoffs {Y (A), A ∈ F} as introduced in (5.1) and study their
fairness.
Definition 13. A family of random variables {Y (A), A ∈ F} is called a family of state
payoffs if Y is a finitely additive vector measure on Ω
Y : F → L∞+
A 7→ Y (A),
that satisfies:
(1) Y (Ω) = K a.s. .
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(2) For each A ∈ F , Y (A) is a random variable on (Ω, σ(Z, 1A)).
Y (A) shall be referred to as payoff for the coalition A.
We make the choice that payoffs {Y (A), A ∈ F} are measurable with respect to σ(Z, 1A)
rather than F . This is in order to have contracts that specify payoffs contingent on the risk
realisation and do not include some other extraneous randomness. Here also, this condition is
not needed from a mathematical point of view, but it is more realistic from an economic point
of view. In the definition we only required that Y is finitely additive. But the interesting
payoffs will become countably additive in the following sense. If (An)n is a sequence of
pairwise disjoint sets taken in F , then
Y (A1) + Y (A2) + ... = Y (∪nAn) = K.
where the sum converges in probability (and not necessarily in L∞ norm).
We now define the admissible payoffs as those state payoffs that satisfy the following
constraints3:
Definition 14. A family of state payoffs Y is admissible if Y ∈ AZ,F(K), where:
AZ,F(K) =
{
Y state payoff
∣∣∣∣ A ⊂ {Z ≥ K} ⇒ Y (A)1A = K1AA ⊂ {Z < K} ⇒ Y (A) ≥ Z1A
}
.
Lemma 3. Any state payoff Y = {Y (A), A ∈ F} ∈ AZ,F(K) has the representation:
Y (A) = α(A)(K − Z)+ + (Z ∧K)1A, (5.2)
where α(A) is an F measurable random variable with values in [0, 1]. The mapping α : F →
L∞+ is a finitely additive vector measure, normalised to 1, i.e. α(Ω) = 1 a.s. . We will refer
to α as the benefit sharing measure corresponding to Y .
Proof. Take Y ∈ AZ,F(K). We claim that if A ⊂ {Z ≥ K} then Y (A)1{Z≥K} = K1A
and if B ⊂ {Z < K} then Y (B)1{Z≥K} = 0. Indeed, if A ⊂ {Z ≥ K}, denoting A˜ :=
{Z ≥ K} \ A and using the additivity, we observe that Y ({Z ≥ K})1{Z≥K} = K1{Z≥K} =(
Y (A) + Y (A˜)
)
1{Z≥K}. As Y (A)1A = K1A and Y (A˜)1A˜ = K1A˜ by the definition of
admissible payoffs, it follows that Y (A)1A˜ = 0. If B ⊂ {Z < K} then we denote B˜ :=
{Z ≥ K} ∪ B and we obtain Y (B˜)1{Z≥K} = (Y (B) + Y ({Z ≥ K})) 1{Z≥K} ≤ K1{Z≥K}.
As Y ({Z ≥ K})1{Z≥K} = K1{Z≥K} and Y is nonnegative, it follows that Y (B)1{Z≥K} = 0.
Hence both claims are proved. We obtain for A ⊂ {Z ≥ K} and B ⊂ {Z < K} the
representations:
Y (A) = K1A + Y (A)1{Z<K}
Y (B) = Z1B + η(B)1{Z<K}.
for some nonnegative random variable η(B).
3The existence of the equity shifts the bankruptcy set from {Z > K} (the default event in absence of
equity, that is, when SX = Z) to Z > K + k0 (that is, the default event with equity k0). The existence
of equity also introduces an asymmetry between players and the payments in default. We choose to ignore
these aspects for now and fully focus on the distribution of the surplus. For this, we only model the surplus
state {Z < K} and its complement. In the next subsection we take care of the precise effect of bankruptcy
and emphasize the positive effect of the bankruptcy procedures.
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Starting from any set E ∈ F we can create a partition A1, A2, B1, B2 of Ω with: A1 =
E∩{Z ≥ K}, B1 = E∩{Z < K}, A2 = Ec∩{Z ≥ K} andB2 = Ec∩{Z < K}. We have that
Y (A1)+Y (A2)+Y (B1)+Y (B2) = K and we can use the decompositions of these payoffs de-
termined above to deduce that (Y (A1) + Y (A2) + η(B1) + η(B2))1{Z<K} = (K−Z)1{Z<K}.
This ensures the existence of nonnegative random variables α(A1), α(A2), α(B1), α(B2) sat-
isfying
∑2
i=1(α(Ai) + α(Bi)) = 1 and such that .
Y (Ai) = K1Ai + α(Ai)(K − Z)1{Z<K}
Y (Bi) = Z1Bi + α(Bi)(K − Z)1{Z<K}.
As E = A1 ∪B1 with A1 ∩B1 = ∅, we have that Y (E) = Y (A1) + Y (B1) and we obtain the
representation (5.2) for Y (E), with α(E) = α(A1) + α(B1). The finite additivity property
of α is inherited from the one of Y . 
Definition 15. (a) Given pi ∈ C
(
cZ
)
, we say that a family of state payoffs Y = {Y (A), A ∈
F} is fair, if for any A ∈ F , the following inequality holds
P(Z1A − Y (A)) + pi(A) ≤ P(Z1A). (5.3)
(b) Given pi ∈ C˜
(
cZ
)
, we say that a family of state payoffs Y = {Y (A), A ∈ F} is fair in
the sense of fuzzy games, if for any λ : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1], the following inequality holds
P(λZ − Y (λ)) + pi(λ) ≤ P(λZ), (5.4)
where pi(λ) =
∫
λ(ω)pi(dω) and
Y (λ) =
∫
λ(ω)Y (dω)
is the integral4 of λ using the vector measure A 7→ Y (A).
Remark 6. We can still interpret fairness of payoffs using preference orders on the space of
bounded random variables. Indeed, Definition 7 can be adapted to the setting where coali-
tions are elements of F . We introduce for each coalition a preference order on L∞(Ω,F ,P):
coalition A ∈ F prefers ξ to η, and we write η ≺A ξ if and only if:
P (Z1A − ξ) < P (Z1A − η) .
We denote weak preference by A, and indifference by ∼A. Then, Y is a family of fair payoffs
if
pi(A) A Y (A) ∀A ∈ F .
We will direct our attention to the case of those fair state payoffs that are also Pareto
optimal for all possible finite partitions of Ω. These are called maximal payoffs and are
defined as follows:
Definition 16. A family of state payoffs Y = {Y (A), A ∈ F} is called maximal if for any
finite sequence of mutually disjoint sets (An) satisfying An ∈ F and ∪An = Ω we have that
{Y (An)}n≥1 is a solution of the following cost minimisation problem:
inf
Y ′∈AZ,F (K)
∑
n
P (Z1An − Y
′(An)) . (5.5)
4 The reader who is not familiar with integration with respect to a finitely additive vector measure can
easily find out that the definition for elementary functions λ can be extended by using the L∞ density.
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Maximal payoffs are such that the costs of residual risks cannot be reduced even by
reallocations of the risks in different portfolios (or coalitions), where a reallocation of risks
corresponds to a partition (An) of Ω.
The following result gathers some properties of maximal payoffs:
Theorem 2. (a) Let α : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1] be a finitely additive probability measure. Then,
the family of state payoffs Y associated to α via the relations (5.2) is maximal.
(b) If Y˜ is maximal, there is a finitely additive probability measure α : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1] so
that
Y (A) ∼A Y˜ (A), ∀A ∈ F ,
where the payoff Y is associated to α via (5.2).
(c) If Y˜ is maximal, then for Q∗ ∈ ∇P(Z):
P
(
−
(
Z1A − Y˜ (A)
)−)
= −EQ∗
[(
Z1A − Y˜ (A)
)−]
, ∀A ∈ F
Proof. (a) By Lemma 3, a state payoff Y˜ = {Y˜ (A), A ∈ F} ∈ AZ,F(K) writes:
Y˜ (A) = α˜(A)(K − Z)+ + (Z ∧K)1A,
where α˜(A) is a vector measure, i.e., the benefit sharing measure. Using commono-
tonicity of P we obtain:
P(Z1A − Y˜ (A)) = P
(
−α˜(A)(K − Z)+ + (Z −K)+1A
)
= P
(
−α˜(A)(K − Z)+
)
+ P
(
(Z −K)+1A
)
and therefore the infimum in (5.5) is obtained by a family of state payoffs Y with its
corresponding benefit sharing measure α being a solution of
inf
α˜
∑
k
P
(
−α˜(Ak)(K − Z)
+
)
, (5.6)
(the infimum being taken over the class of all vector measures on F), and this for
any (Ak), finite partition of Ω. We observe that∑
k
P
(
−α˜(Ak)(K − Z)
+
)
≥ P
(
−
∑
k
α˜(Ak)(K − Z)
+
)
= P
(
−(K − Z)+
)
.
In case (α˜(A1), α˜(A2), · · · , α˜(An)) is non random, we can use homogeneity of P to
show that we get equality above instead of an inequality, so that the infimum is
attained by this vector. Therefore any finitely additive probability measure α on F
is a solution of (5.6). Furthermore the infimum in (5.5) equals
P
(
−(K − Z)+
)
+
∑
k
P
(
(Z −K)+1Ak
)
.
(b) In general, for a solution α˜ of (5.6), we denote
α(A) :=
P (−α˜(A)(K − Z)+)
P (−(K − Z)+)
, ∀A ∈ F .
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Then, α is a finitely additive measure. Indeed it is nonnegative, α(Ω) = 1 and finite
additivity is also verified: for any (Ak), a finite partition of Ω, the random variables
ξ˜k := −α˜(Ak)(K − Z)
+
satisfy — as α˜ is a solution of (5.6) —∑
k
P
(
ξ˜k
)
= P
(∑
k
ξ˜k
)
= P
(
−(K − Z)+
)
. (5.7)
We see that the property in (b) holds when α is as above: Y (A) ∼A Y˜ (A), ∀A ∈ F ,
as one can easily verify.
(c) Let α˜ be the benefit sharing measure associated with Y˜ , so that we have for all
A ∈ F : (Z1A − Y˜ (A))− = α˜(A)(K − Z)+. Above, we have seen that whenever Y˜
maximal, the equality (5.7) holds, ∀(Ak)k finite partition of Ω. From Lemma 1, for
any Q∗ ∈ ∇P(Z):
P
(
−(K − Z)+
)
= EQ∗
[
−(K − Z)+
]
= −
∑
k
EQ∗
[
α˜(Ak)(K − Z)
+
]
.
Using these equalities, we obtain∑
n
(
P
(
−α(An)(K − Z)
+
)
+ EQ∗
[
α(An)(K − Z)
+
])
= 0.
which proves the statement, as the sum only contains nonnegative terms.

Theorem 3. Let Q∗ ∈ ∇P(Z) and pi∗ := Z · Q∗ ∈ C˜
(
cZ
)
. We consider state payoffs
Y ∗ = {Y ∗(A), A ∈ F}:
Y ∗(A) = α∗(A)(K − Z)+ + (Z ∧K)1A, (5.8)
with α∗ ≪ P satisfying
α∗ =
(Z −K)+
EQ∗ [(Z −K)+]
·Q∗. (5.9)
Then the following hold:
(a) Given pi∗, the family Y ∗ is fair.
(b) Assume Y˜ (A), A ∈ F is a family of state payoffs that is maximal and fair given pi∗,
in the sense of fuzzy games. Then there exists Q̂ ∈ ∇P(Z ∧K) so that
P(Z1A − Y˜ (A)) = P(Z1A − Ŷ (A)) ∀A ∈ F ,
that is, (using preference relations in Remark 6)
∀A ∈ F Y˜ (A) ∼A Ŷ (A),
where Ŷ is defined as
Ŷ (A) = α̂(A)(K − Z)+ + (Z ∧K)1A, (5.10)
with
α̂(A) :=
pi∗(A)− E
Q̂
[(Z ∧K)1A]
P ((Z −K)+)
. (5.11)
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Proof of Theorem 3. As α∗ is a probability measure, from Theorem 2 (a), the family Y ∗ is
admissible and maximal.
Using (2.2) in (5.9) we obtain that
α∗(A) :=
EQ∗ [(Z −K)+1A]
P ((Z −K)+)
. (5.12)
By the commonotonicity and positive homogeneity of P and the expressions in Lemma 1:
P(Z1A − Y
∗(A)) = P(−(Z1A − Y
∗(A))−) + P((Z1A − Y
∗(A))+)
= α∗(A)P(−(K − Z)+) + P((Z −K)+1A)
= −α∗(A)EQ∗ [(Z −K)
+] + P((Z −K)+1A)
and
P(Z1A) = P ((Z ∧K)1A) + P
(
(Z −K)+1A
)
.
Therefore, the inequality defining fairness
P(Z1A − Y
∗(A)) + pi∗(A) ≤ P(Z1A), ∀A ∈ F ,
writes:
EQ∗ [Z1A]− α
∗(A)EQ∗ [(K − Z)
+] ≤ P [(Z ∧K)1A] , ∀A ∈ F (5.13)
that, after replacing α∗(A) with its expression, is equivalent to:
EQ∗ [(Z ∧K)1A] ≤ P [(Z ∧K)1A] , ∀A ∈ F .
This is always satisfied, so that (a) is proved.
The claim in (b) is proved as follows. First, one can check that Ŷ is fair given pi∗, by
replacing in the inequality (5.13) α∗ with α̂.
Let Y˜ be maximal and fair. From Theorem 2 (b), it is sufficient to consider the case where
its corresponding benefit sharing measure α˜ is a finitely additive measure. In this case, it is
not difficult to check that Y˜ (A) ∼A Ŷ (A) if and only if α˜(A) = α̂(A).
Therefore, it is necessary and sufficient to show that whenever Y˜ satisfies: (i) is fair in
the sense of fuzzy games, (ii) is maximal and (iii) its corresponding benefit sharing measure
α˜(A) is a finitely additive measure, then there is Q̂ ∈ ∇P(Z ∧K) so that α˜(A) = α̂(A).
Following similar steps as in the proof of (a) we find that the inequality
P(λZ − Y˜ (λ)) + pi(λ) ≤ P(λZ), ∀λ ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (5.14)
that characterises fair payoffs in the fuzzy game sense, is equivalent to
EQ∗ [λZ − α˜(λ)(K − Z)
+] ≤ P [λ(Z ∧K)] , ∀λ ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
We define the family (δ(A)) with
δ(A) := EQ∗ [Z1A − α˜(A)(K − Z)
+].
It can be verified that this is a finitely additive measure of total mass P (Z ∧K) and the
inequality (5.14) is equivalent to:∫
λdδ ≤ P [λ(Z ∧K)] , ∀λ ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
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In other words, δ is an element of the set{
ν ∈ ba(Ω,F ,P) | ν(Ω) = P (Z ∧K) ,
∫
λdν ≤ P [λ(Z ∧K)] , ∀λ ∈ L∞
}
.
We obtain that there exists Q̂ ∈ ∇P(X ∧K), such that δ(A) = E
Q̂
[(Z ∧K)1A]. Implicitly,
we find an expression for α˜:
α˜(A) =
EQ∗ [Z1A]− EQ̂[(Z ∧K)1A]
EQ∗ [(K − Z)+]
,
that is exactly α̂. 
5.2. Fair contracts in the N + 1 players game. We consider the framework of Section
4. The next theorem gives the form of some fair insurance contracts.
Theorem 4. Suppose that Q∗ ∈ ∇P(SX) and
pii = EQ∗ [Xi], for i ∈ {1, .., N}.
Consider the contracts {(pii, Yi)}Ni=1 with standard payoffs (i.e., the payoffs are as in (3.2))
such that the constant proportions (αi) given by:
αi =
EQ∗
[
Xi
SX
(SX −K)+
]
P [(SX − k)+]
for i ∈ {1, .., N}. (5.15)
These contracts are fair and maximal. Furthermore, for the shareholders:
P(X0 − Y0) = 0
and
k0 = EQ∗ [Y0].
Remark 7. We can associate with SX a probability measure α∗ : (Ω,F)→ [0, 1]:
α∗ :=
(SX − k)+
EQ∗ [(SX − k)+]
dQ∗
Then, one can verify that
αi = Eα∗
[
Xi − Yi∑N
i=0(Xi − Yi)
]
; i = 0, 1, ..., N.
As the probability α∗ assigns the entire mass to the default event, we can interpret the fair
benefit share of agent i, αi as being the expected value under α
∗ of the proportion of loss in
default of agent i over the total loss in default of all agents.
Remark 8. There is no uniqueness of the fair contracts. The fair premia in Theorem 4
are known as an allocation in the fuzzy core of the game cX. Even if we consider a specific
premium vector pi that is fixed, there is no uniqueness of the fair payoffs given pi. In Theorem
3, the general forms of fair payoffs given pi was derived for the fuzzy game cZ .
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Proof. The fact that pi ∈ C(cX), where pii = EQ∗ [Xi] for all i ∈ N , is already a known result
and trivial to verify directly.
By Lemma 2, Y are maximal. We now prove that Y are fair payoffs given pi. As in the
previous subsection, we use the notation
Z = SX + k0
and
λi =
Xi
Z
or Xi = λiZ, for i = 0, ..., N.
We use the notation from Subsection 5.1, in particular we take Y ∗ to be the state payoff
family defined in Theorem 3. We have
Y ∗(λi) =
∫
λi(ω
′)Y ∗(dω′) = Eα∗ [λi](K − Z)
+ + λi(Z ∧K)
=
EQ∗ [(Z −K)+λi]
P ((Z −K)+)
(K − Z)+ + (Z ∧K)λi.
By Theorem 3, Y ∗ = {Y ∗(A), A ∈ F} ∈ AZ,F(K) is a family of state payoffs that are fair in
the sense of fuzzy games, that is:
P(λZ − Y ∗(λ)) + pi∗(λ) ≤ P(λZ), ∀λ ∈ L∞, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
We recall that above pi∗ = Z · Q∗ (see Theorem 3). We can take in the above inequality
λ = λ(S), where λ(S) :=
∑
i∈S λi =
∑
i∈S
Xi
Z
for S ⊂ N . We obtain that
P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Y
∗(λi))
)
+ EQ∗
[∑
i∈S
Xi
]
≤ P
(∑
i∈S
Xi
)
, ∀S ∈ N .
The inequalities above write:
P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Y
∗(λi))
)
+
∑
i∈S
pii ≤ c
X(S), ∀S ∈ N . (5.16)
We now treat separately the case with and without equity.
(i) Let us assume that X0 = k0 = 0, so that we have no equity and K = k, Z = S
X. In
this particular case:
Y ∗(λi) =
EQ∗ [(S
X −K)+λi]
P ((SX −K)+)
(K − SX)+ + (SX ∧K)λi
= αi(K − S
X)+ + (SX ∧K)
Xi
SX
=
[
Xi + αi
(
k − SX
)]
1{SX≤k} +Xi
(
K
SX
∧ 1
)
1{SX>k}
that is exactly expression (3.2) with αi as in Theorem 4. This proves that
Yi = Y
∗(λi) ∈ A
X(K).
Then, the fact that Y = (Y0, ..., YN) is a fair payoff for the risk X = (X0, ..., XN)
follows from the fact that pi = (0, pi1, ..., piN) ∈ C(cX) and the above. Indeed (5.16)
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writes
cX−Y(S) +
∑
i∈S
pii ≤ c
X(S), ∀S ∈ N .
(ii) Suppose k0 > 0 that is, K = k + k0 > k. The presence of equity introduces an
asymmetry between players, as equityholders have lower priority with no payment
in case of default. In addition, the presence of equity shrinks the default event from
{Z > K} to {Z > K + k0} = {SX > K}. In this situation, Y ∗(λi) 6= Yi and even
Y ∗(λi) /∈ AX(K). In view of (5.16), to prove fairness of Y it is sufficient to show
cX−Y(S) ≤ P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Y
∗(λi))
)
, ∀S ∈ N . (5.17)
We observe that for all Y ∈ AX(K) we have:
{∃i ∈ N : Xi − Yi > 0} ⊂ ∩i∈N{Xj − Yj ≥ 0} = {S
X ≥ k} = {Z ≥ K}
and also
{∃i ∈ N : Xi − Yi < 0} ⊂ ∩i∈N {Xj − Yj ≤ 0} = {S
X ≤ k} = {Z ≤ K}.
Same expressions hold true if we replace Yi with Y
∗(λi).
Therefore, for any Y ∈ AX(K), Y vector of standard payoffs, we have(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
)+
=
∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
+
and (∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
)−
=
∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
− =
∑
i∈S
αi(K − Z)
+
(the last equality comes from the definition of the standard payoffs).
Let us consider S ⊂ N \ {0}. Using the commonotonicity of P we have
cX−Y(S) = P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
)
= P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
+
)
+ P
(
−
∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
−
)
= P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
+
)
+
∑
i∈S
αiP
(
−(K − Z)+
)
= P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Yi)
+
)
−
∑
i∈S
αiP
(
(Z −K)+
)
= P
(∑
i∈S
Xi
SX
(SX −K)+
)
− EQ∗
[∑
i∈S
Xi
SX
(SX −K)+
]
= P(η(S))− EQ∗ [η(S)].
23
For simplicity, we have denoted above η(S) :=
∑
i∈S
Xi
SX
(SX − K)+. Also we have
used the expressions for αi that are given in Theorem 4. Similarily
P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Y
∗(λi))
)
= P
(
λ(S)(Z −K)+
)
−
∑
i∈S
Eα∗ [λi]P
(
(Z −K)+
)
= P
(∑
i∈S
Xi
Z
(Z −K)+
)
− EQ∗
[∑
i∈S
Xi
Z
(Z −K)+
]
= P(ξ(S))− EQ∗ [ξ(S)].
We recall λi = Xi/Z. Also we denoted ξ(S) :=
∑
i∈S
Xi
Z
(Z −K)+.
We notice that for any S ⊂ N \ {0} we have that the random variable γ(S) :=
ξ(S)− η(S) is commonotonic with η(S). Indeed,
γ(S) =
∑
i∈S
Xi
{(
K
SX
−
K
SX + k0
)
1SX>K +
(
1−
K
SX + k0
)
1SX∈[k,K]
}
and
η(S) =
∑
i∈S
Xi
(
1−
K
SX
)
1SX>K .
Therefore:
P
(∑
i∈S
(Xi − Y
∗(λi))
)
= P(γ(S)) + P(η(S))− EQ∗ [γ(S) + η(S)] =
= (P(γ(S))− EQ∗ [γ(S)]) + c
X−Y(S) ≥ cX−Y(S).
Thus we have proved (5.17) for all S ⊂ N \ {0} and it remains to prove the same
holds when we include the element {0}.
We notice that pi0 = k0 = P(X0) and furthermore, for all S ⊂ N \{0}, the random
variable X0−Y0 is commonotonic with
∑
i∈S(Xi−Yi) which verifies that (5.17) holds
for S ∪ {0} whenever it holds for S.

6. Conclusion on the positive role of equity and bankruptcy procedures
In this paper we used cooperative game theory in order to determine the fair part of agents
in the surplus of a company. The analysis also provides an insight on the role of equity and
the positive economic effects of the bankruptcy rules: by introducing a lower priority in
default for shareholders as compared to the insured, the impact of default of all players is
reduced. Inequality (5.17) is the mathematical transcription of this fact. The reason behind
is that in standard contracts, the shareholder’s net position X0 − Y0 is commonotonic with
the total risk SX. But also, X0 − Y0 is commonotonic with a net position Xi − Yi of any
insured agent. This property is achieved due to the bankruptcy rules which prevent the
shareholder to receive payments in default. If shareholders were to have the same priority in
default as insured agents, this would lead to a break in the commonotonicity property above
mentioned and a destruction of value for all agents. Indeed, an increase of the residual risk
of all agents in equilibrium occurs, as measured by the right hand term of (5.17).
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